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Drawing on the literature from the fields of cognitive and social psychology, sociology, and 
political science, we discuss perceptions of risks and benefits, the impact of perceptions and 
personal preferences on choice and behavior, the question of “socially acceptable” thresholds 
of risk, and the analytic and descriptive means by which such thresholds might be identified. 
We hypothesize that existing psychometric methods may be adapted for the scaling of 
perceived benefit. We review factors hampering the application of formal methodologies in 
the resolution of controversial public debates, and express doubt about the identification of a 
socially acceptable threshold of risk. We argue that the emphasis of research in this field 
should be shifted toward explicating the use of risk and benefit perceptions in the process of 
personal decision-making. Finally, we suggest several social science research approaches that 
may be used to address these issues, 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The discussion which follows is, primarily, a 
literature review, but one that is written from a 
particular perspective. As professional researchers, 
we have encountered the question of risk perceptions 
in a variety of contexts which, in the case of one of 
the authors, dates back more than 25 We 
also have tended to concern ourselves with topical 
questions that affect the population as a whole and 
with the social processes that are associated with 
them.“-@ As a result, this literature review will at- 
tempt to go beyond the research that usually is 
reported in relation to the perceptions of technologi- 
cal risk and to draw linkages between a number of 
recent research activities in psychology, sociology, 
and political science. In doing so, we hope to indicate 
the possibilities for future research which might both 
broaden our understanding of risk perceptions and 
highhght their impact on personal preferences and 
the potential for social mobilization. 
A growing body of research has been performed 
on perceptions of risks from technologies. Among 
other things, this research has demonstrated that 
“perceived risk” is a multidimensional concept and 
that only one of those dimensions corresponds, 
roughly, with a formal definition of risk in the s e e  
sense of deaths per ‘annum. Though much less work 
has been done on the question of “perceived benefit,” 
we hypothesize, on the basis of the reported results 
and in light of our previous work in other areas, that 
“perceived benefit” is also a multidimensional con- 
cept and that it can be scaled in a manner similar to 
that now used to assess perceived risks. We sense that 
new research efforts along these lines will be highly 
productive. 
‘Institute for Public Policy Studies, The University of Michigan, 
Ann Arbor, Michigan 48 109 
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Our reading of the literature leads us to suggest 
shifted toward an explication of the use of risk and 
that the focus of research in this field should be 
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benefit perceptions in the process of personal deci- 
sion-making. At the present time, it is assumed that 
perceived risks weigh heavily in the decision; for 
example, to oppose the implementation of a new 
technology. The actual weight accorded to this aspect 
of the decision problem is uncertain, however. 
In light of the complexities of social decision- 
making processes, and in view of the absence of data 
indicating the weights accorded to perceived risk in 
personal decision processes, we feel that it would be 
premature to attempt a specification of thresholds of 
“socially acceptable” risk. The results of formal, ana- 
lytic methodologies are likely to be challenged by 
members of the lay public, or by socially and politi- 
cally active groups seeking to represent the public’s 
interests. Furthermore, the descriptive social sciences 
have not generated a body of data that could be used 
to justify any specific threshold. Social decisions are 
rarely made with respect to risk, per se. Rather, they 
evolve in relation to a proposed activity that entails 
risks, benefits, and a variety of less tangible consider- 
ations. The social risk may be balanced legitimately 
against these other considerations and one cannot say 
at the present time how this is done, either at the 
personal or at the social levels. 
In the following section we review the recent 
work on risk perceptions, touching on the familiar 
topics of heuristics and biases and the multidimen- 
sional character of “perceived risk.” We will discuss 
as well the possibility of developing measures of 
perceived benefit. Section 3. discusses the topic of 
“socially acceptable” risk and the factors which may 
affect the public’s reaction to a particular technologi- 
cal program. And finally, section 4. reviews briefly 
the literature concerning choice and decision-making 
in the face of risk and uncertainty. We focus on a few 
of the recently developed theoretical models which 
might be employed in future research on the topic of 
perceived technological risks. 
2. INDIVIDUAL PERCEPTIONS OF RISKS 
AND BENEFITS 
Perceived risk is considered formally to be a 
function of one’s subjective probability estimates and 
is represented as the set of bets about uncertain 
outcomes that the decision-maker is willing to accept 
in attempting to make a specific choice. The criteria 
for validity for subjective probability estimates are 
rooted solely in the axioms of decision theory. Thus, 
different decision-makers can subscribe to different 
subjective probability estimates for the same set of 
events, and these subjective estimates need not, nec- 
essarily, conform with objectively derived probability 
estimates. Consequently, valid subjective probabil- 
ities that are “off the mark” will lead to perfectly 
defensible, though suboptimal, choices. In reference 
to policy choices associated with the risk of technolo- 
gies, Slovic and his associates have commented that 
people “respond to the hazards they perceive. If their 
perceptions are faulty, efforts at public and environ- 
mental protection are likely to be mi~directed.”‘~) 
This comment touches upon two interrelated points. 
First, one may speculate on the extent to which the 
risk perceptions of the lay public are calibrated with 
the “objective” estimates of risk that are being pro- 
vided by technologists and professional risk analysts. 
The issue will be discussed in the section that follows. 
The second question concerns the weight assigned to 
risk perceptions, however well or poorly calibrated 
they may be, by members of the lay public when 
choosing between alternative courses of action that 
involve some element of risk. This question will be 
addressed in section 4. of this paper. 
2.1. Calibration with Low-Probability, 
High-Consequence Events 
Researchers have developed a variety of experi- 
mental techniques to investigate the facility with 
which subjects conceptualize uncertainty as a proba- 
bility distribution and the degree to which these 
subjective probabilities reflect objective evidence. In 
a review of studies concerned with “calibration” of 
such probability estimates, Lichtenstein and her asso- 
ciates conclude that most subjects fail to discriminate 
adequately among different levels of uncertainty and 
that the most common form of error is “over- 
confidence.”(8) Subjectively derived probability distri- 
butions tend to be too tightly grouped around the 
outcome perceived as most likely, and this point 
estimate is all-too-frequently wide of the mark. Re- 
lated experiments have sought to determine whether 
and to what extent training, intelligence, and sub- 
stantive expertise affect these judgments. The results 
appear to be inconclusive and frequently contradic- 
tory, though there is some evidence to suggest that 
training in the use of an elicitation procedure im- 
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proves calibration@) and that experts (e.g., profes- 
sional weather forecasters) tend to be better calibrated 
than 
Of particular concern for policy making purpo- 
ses is the potential inaccuracy of judgments relating 
to low-probability, high-consequence events. Slovic 
and his colleagues have studied this question through 
a set of experiments in which subjects were asked to 
discriminate among various causes of death, the ob- 
jective probabilities of whxh varied from about 1 X 
for heart dis- 
ease.(12. 13) They found that: 
for botulism to about 8.5 X 
(a) our subjects had a consistent subjective scale of 
relative infrequency for causes of death; 
(b) this subjective scale often deviated from the true 
scale; 
(c) the subjects could consistently identify which of 
the paired events was a more frequent cause of 
death only when the true ratio of greater to 
lesser frequency was greater than 2 : 1. At true 
ratios of 2: 1 or below, discrimination was 
poor.(I2) 
Commenting on similar evidence, Slovic and his asso- 
ciates concluded that “in general, rare causes of death 
were overestimated and common causes of death 
were ~nderestimated.”(~) 
2.2. Heuristics and Biases 
Tversky and Kahneman, in reviewing the results 
of several experiments conducted by themselves and 
by others, have argued that systematic biases in the 
subjective assessment of probabilities can be traced 
to a “limited number of heuristic principles which 
reduce the complex tasks of assessing probabilities 
and predicting values to simpler judgmental opera- 
t i o n ~ . ” ( ~ ~ )  They introduce three such heuristic princi- 
ples labelled “representativeness,” “availability,” and 
“anchoring and adjustment” to account for the in- 
consistent and anomalous judgments they report. 
The “representativeness” heuristic can lead to 
biased judgments through an over-reliance upon as- 
sessments of similarity between profiles that char- 
acterize the alternative outcomes and the schematic 
representations of examples that are presented (or 
stored in memory) as background information rele- 
vant to the task at hand. The evidence suggests that 
pattern matching dominates the judgmental process 
and that other, relevant considerations, such as the 
validity of the information presented, the prior prob- 
abilities, or the sample size, are discounted dispro- 
portionately. 
In light of the weight that is accorded to pattern 
matching efforts during the derivation of probability 
estimates, one is led to speculate on the means by 
which relevant patterns or are men- 
tally stored, recalled, and/or reconstructed: the 
“availability” of a representative pattern may sub- 
stantially affect judgments of the probability of oc- 
currence of events or outcomes that could be likened 
to that pattern. The availability of suitable schemata 
could be affected by the size of the class of instances 
which can be represented by that pattern, or by the 
emotional saliency of selected instances. For situa- 
tions in which a suitable pattern is not readily re- 
called, the judgment of probability could be affected 
by the effectiveness of the search set used in making 
an infrequent or unfamiliar memory scan, or by the 
“imaginability” of an Occurrence similar to the one 
implied by the pending judgment. 
Error can be introduced as well through the 
inferential calculus by which an individual derives an 
explicit estimate of probability. Tversky and 
Kahnernan(l4) note that subjects tend to derive their 
final estimates in relation to some initial value which 
is then adjusted in accordance with information rele- 
vant to the specific problem under consideration. 
These adjustments, however, tend to be insufficient, 
leading to final estimates that are biased toward the 
initial value that served as the “anchor” point. 
Slovic, Fischhoff, Lichtenstein, and others have 
experimented with several psychometric techniques 
for the elicitation of individual perceptions of risk 
from a variety of technologies. Methods of obtaining 
indi-vidual estimates of “acceptable risk’’ and “gross 
benefits” have been tested as well.(79 16) A principal 
concern of these experiments was to identify the 
factors that affect perceptions of risk from technolo- 
gies. Risk estimates obtained from a small group of 
“experts” were highly correIated with statistical data 
describing annual fatalities, thereby indicating that, 
among experts, perceptions of risk were a function of 
the available statistical evidence and little else. Simi- 
lar comparisons obtained for small samples of lay 
people, however, showed modest correlations at best, 
leading to the conclusion that perceptions of risk 
among lay people were based on other considera- 
tions. In light of Tversky and Kahneman’s discussion 
of heuristics, one might speculate that an individual’s 
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perceptions of risk were a function of the qualitative 
characteristics that a subject was willing to attribute 
to a technology. 
2.3. Qualitative Risk and Benefit Perception: 
At&ibute Profiles 
Slovic and his colleagues have explored this hy- 
pothesis by asking their subjects to generate risk 
profiles of selected technologies and activities using 
as attributional characteristics the dimensions of risk 
that have been suggested by L~wrance(’~) and others. 
The results of these experiments demonstrate that 
subjects can generate rather detailed “risk profiles” 
for technologies and hazards. Furthermore, through 
the use of multivariate statistical techniques (factor 
analysis) these profiles can be summarized within as 
few as three orthogonal  dimension^.'^) These three 
dimensions and their component attributes are sum- 
marized in Table I. Two of these three factors, whose 
components suggested the labels “Dread” and 
“Number of People Exposed” correlate well with the 
measure of perceived risk; the “Dread” factor in 
particular could explain a substantial portion of the 
variance in the measure [see Table IX, in ref (7) and 
also ref (16)) These findings support the hypothesis 
that, among lay people at least, perceptions of risk 
from technologies are substantially affected by 
qualitative considerations that extend well beyond 
the more rigid, statistical definition of the concept. 
The representativeness heuristic appears to play 
a particularly important role in shaping perceptions 
of risk from technologies. Whereas the “Exposure” 
factor was correlated with the indicator of perceived 
risk, the “Dread” factor appeared to be the primary 
determinant of perceived risk in these experiments. 
On the basis of this evidence, one suspects that 
perceptions of risk among lay people are strongly 
influenced by the individual‘s mental representation 
of the technology and that these schemata are deeply 
colored by one’s “gut reactions” to selected aspects of 
this mental image (e.g., dread, concern for the safety 
of future generations, potential for the catastrophe, 
etc.). Parallel findings were reported for the indicator 
of “acceptable” risk. 
The evidence for perceptions of benefits is less 
clear, in part because the measurement of “perceived 
benefit” has proven to be a more difficult task than 
the psychometric measurement of perceived risk. In- 
deed, one of the major challenges facing researchers 
Table I. 18 Risk Characteristics 
Factors Risk characteristics 
Factor 1: “Dread” 1. Severity not controllable 
2. Dread 
3. Globally catastrophic 
4. Little preventive control 
5. Certain to be fatal 
6. Risks and benefits inequitable 
7. Catastrophic 
8. Threatens future generations 
9. Not easily reduced 
10. Risks increasing 
1 1 .  Involuntary 
12. Affects me personally 
13. Not observable 
14. Unknown to those exposed 
15. Effects immediate 
16. New (unfamiliar) 
17. Unknown to science 
18. Many people exposed 
Factor 2: “Familiarity” 
Factor 3 : “Exposure” 
in this field of inquiry is the development of robust 
indicators for the measurement of perceived benefit. 
The difficulties in developing such indicators go well 
beyond the mechanics of designing and testing a 
variety of complementary measurement techniques; 
one is lacking, as well, a comprehensive theory of 
“perceived benefit.” 
One candidate for such a theory and associated 
measurement technique might be the “willingness to 
pay” criterion of welfare economics. In principle it 
should be possible to generate demand curves for 
certain products and services which indicate at each 
point along the curve one’s willingness to pay for 
incremental additions of the good or service. Tlus 
demand curve should also help to identify the con- 
sumer surplus (willingness to pay over the actual 
market price) which could be associated with the 
concept of net benefit. In practice such demand 
curves have proven quite difficult to generate, either 
because of the lack of appropriate market data or 
because of complex statistical problems related to the 
identification of a set of recursive equations. 
Quite apart from the technical problems associ- 
ated with the approach, however, one might legiti- 
mately question what it means at the individual level 
to ask about one’s willingness to pay for automotive 
transportation or electrical energy, to take two exam- 
ples, in a society that is structured around the availa- 
bility and frequent use of both. Individuals may have 
relatively few options, particularly in the short run, 
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for altering their consumption patterns with respect 
to technologies that are structurally embedded in the 
social fabric. If, as we suspect, one of the principal 
perceived benefits of technological systems such as 
these is their continued and uninterrupted availabil- 
ity, then questions probing the individual’s willing- 
ness to pay for this availability will be strongly 
conditioned by an element of implied coercion. 
This problem could be avoided in part through 
the development of interviewing techniques that as- 
sume implicitly a continuing flow of services; so that 
benefit, with respect to access and availability, re- 
mains roughly constant across technological options. 
The interviewing tasks would focus on the less tangi- 
ble aspects of “perceived benefit” which might in- 
fluence the individual‘s overall assessment of specific 
technological options. Then efforts at psychometric 
scaling would be directed toward individual judg- 
ments on issues like convenience, reliability, comfort, 
and design. The outcome of these efforts would be 
psychometric measurements of “perceived benefit” 
that would be descriptive, rather than normative, in 
nature. 
We anticipate that psychometric research will 
demonstrate “perceived benefit” to be a multidimen- 
sional concept that is roughly complementary to that 
of “perceived risk.” This is a very modest hypothesis. 
Benefit-cost analysts are fully aware that “benefits” 
are multifaceted; the trick of their profession is to 
find a means to map all of the separate elements into 
a single metric representing market value. There is, 
however, no single metric within psychological re- 
search that could withstand such heroic manipula- 
tions. Thus, one might anticipate research and debate 
concerning both the number and the composition of 
the dimensions that explicate “perceived benefit.” 
Results reported by Slovic and his associates indicate 
that perceptions of risk and benefits are inversely 
correlated. Consequently, the perception of benefits 
may be affected in a fashion that is comparable, 
though inversely structured, to the perception of risks. 
We hypothesize that a balanced set of risk/benefit 
characteristics (i.e., a balanced schedule of positive 
and negative attributes) could lead to parallel conclu- 
sions concerning the factors that affect these comple- 
mentary, though inversely correlated, perceptions. 
Otway and Fishbein have conducted a number 
of small pilot studies of attitudes toward nuclear 
power in Au~tria.(”~’~) Their focus was primarily 
methodological: To develop methods for measuring 
differential perceptions of risks and benefits of 
nuclear power among individuals who held contrast- 
ing viewpoints on these issues. The theoretical model 
they adopted was that of Fishbein(20,21) which seeks 
to link an individual‘s attitudes toward an object, a 
nuclear power plant in this instance, to the individ- 
ual‘s belief structure, subjective evaluation of “truth” 
probabilities, intentions, and, ultimately, behaviors.(’*) 
Owing to the preliminary nature of these studies, the 
results are somewhat difficult to interpret. Nonethe- 
less, Otway and Fishbein were able to obtain a factor 
structure using elicitation methods that are roughly 
comparable to those of Slovic and his associates. 
Furthermore, the schedule of attributes employed in 
these studies incorporated numerous positive char- 
acteristics in addition to the risk dimensions sug- 
gested by Lowrance: The positive attributes were 
associated with perceptions of benefit, especially 
among those subjects who were classified as being 
favorable to nuclear power. Finally, the belief struc- 
tures evidenced by the “pro” and “antinuclear” sub- 
jects revealed sharp contrasts in their perceptual 
frameworks, emphasizing once again the importance 
of individual heuristics. 
Green and B r o ~ n ( ~ ~ - ~ ~ )  have studied perceptions 
of risk and safety in the United Kingdom using small 
samples of students and lay persons. Though their 
primary focus has been on perceptions of risk from 
fires, their methodology parallels in many respects 
that of Slovic and his associates. As was reported for 
Slovic’s experiments, the findings of Green and Brown 
suggest the perceptions of risk and safety are strongly 
conditioned by the qualitative attributes associated 
with technologies and with risky activities. Green and 
Brown argue that these mental images constitute 
expectations, or “conjectures” about possible future 
occurences, and that the individual, as an “intuitive 
scientist,” evaluates potential risk in accordance with 
these conjectures. This argument closely parallels re- 
cent discussions in cognitive psychology. 
Vlek and Stallen(26) have recently completed a 
major study of perceptions of risk among the resi- 
dents of the metropolitan area surrounding Rotter- 
dam, Netherlands. Unfortunately, the results of this 
study are not yet available for distribution in English. 
Personal communications with the principal investi- 
gators, however, indicate that this research project 
extended several techniques developed by Slovic and 
his collagues and that many of the preliminary 
research results corroborate those reported by Slovic. 
In particular, it appears that perceptions of risk from 
technologies and industrial facilities were influenced 
148 Cole and Withey 
heavily by a wide range of qualitative characteristics 
that their subjects associated with these installations. 
Through the use of multidimensional scaling tech- 
n ique~(~’-~~)  Vlek and Stallen were able to develop 
cognitive maps of these perceptions in a format simi- 
lar to the factor analyses reported by Slovic and 
Fischhoff. These cognitive maps indicate the primary 
dimensions along which risk is evaluated, the place- 
ment of various technologies within the perceptual 
space defined by these dimensions, and the relative 
acceptability of the risks involved. An additional 
aspect of this research was the use of Q-sort tech- 
niques as a means of revealing preferences among 
risky technologies and the extent to which subjects 
were willing to consider trade-offs between the risks 
and benefits associated with the technologies under 
consideration. This approach permits researchers to 
study not only the factors that affect perceptions of 
risk, but also the cognitive process of choice in the 
face of risk and uncertainty. 
2.4. Discussion 
On the basis of the studies that have been 
summarized above, it is possible to draw several 
conclusions concerning the most profitable avenues 
for further research on the question of perceived risk: 
Perceptions of risk among the lay population are 
poorly calibrated when compared with objec- 
tive, statistical data. The relevant studies indi- 
cate that subjects rely upon individual heuristics 
when evaluating potential risk, and that these 
heuristics tend to systematically bias perceptions 
of risk. We conclude, therefore, that further 
research on this question should be guided by 
recent theoretical and methodological develop- 
ments in cognitive psychology that stress 
schemata and information processing. 
Despite their lack of technical calibration, indi- 
vidual perceptions of risk can be analyzed suc- 
cessfully by recourse to psychometric techniques 
that allow subjects to characterize risky technol- 
ogies and activities according to sets of qualita- 
tive dimensions such as those proposed by 
Lowrance and others. The number and composi- 
tion of these “risk dimensions” varied slightly 
from one study to the next. These variations 
could result from any of three sources of insta- 
bility: (a) differences in testing instruments, (b) 
differences in samples of subjects; or (c) fluctua- 
tions in attitudes over time. This latter observa- 
tion leads to the suggestion that future research 
might seek to establish a standardized instru- 
ment that is administered to representative sam- 
ples of some identifiable population at several 
points in time. This approach would allow one 
to identify both the source and the extent of any 
apparent fluctuations in risk perceptions. 
(3) Perceptions of benefits have been studied more 
recently and somewhat less successfully than 
perceptions of risk. On the basis of available 
evidence, however, there is reason to believe that 
perceived benefits could be studied in a manner 
that is analogous to that which has proved suc- 
cessful for the study of perceived risk. Extrapo- 
lating from the work done by Otway and 
Fishbein and by Vlek and Stallen, we speculate 
that it will be possible to identify a limited set of 
perceived benefit dimensions that are based on 
responses to questions of a qualitative and com- 
parative nature. Furthermore, we would expect 
that many of the methodological issues to be 
confronted in this research will be similar in 
nature to those that have been tackled in recent 
studies of perceived quality of life.(4730) The ex- 
perience gained in mapping the dimensions of 
perceived life quality may prove quite useful in 
mapping the dimensions of perceived benefit 
from technologies. 
(4) Through the use of multidimensional scaling 
techniques, it should be possible to develop cog- 
nitive maps which summarize the most salient 
dimensions along which perceived risk and ben- 
efit are evaluated. These analytic techniques 
would permit not only the identification of the 
most salient evaluative dimensions, but addi- 
tionally could be used to cluster technologies 
and activities according to the similarity of their 
risk/benefit profiles and to identify subgroups 
of individuals who hold contrasting viewpoints 
on these issues. 
( 5 )  The bulk of research in this field has focused on 
perceptions of risk and the factors that comprise 
such perceptions. Questions of choice and con- 
sequent behavior have been touched upon only 
in passing. Having explicated some of the fac- 
tors that comprise perceptions of risk, the re- 
searchers in this field might now seek to explore 
the extent to which these and other factors, such 
as those representing perceived benefit, explain 
preferences and choice behavior. For example, 
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by incorporating sorting techniques as part of 
the data collection methodology it would be 
possible to obtain indications of individual pref- 
erences among activities that incorporate risky 
technologies. These preference structures could 
be analyzed in light of both the characteristics 
This is not the case, as both the experiences of 
frustrated political leaders and the literature of politi- 
cal science and sociology would readily verify. The 
determination of an “optimal” resolution to a social 
controversy can be frustrated, or even precluded, by 
such factors as: 
of the individual-and the attributional profiles 
that the individual has assigned to a set of risky 
technologies. Analyses of this type, which fall 
within the tradition of standard econometric 
research, would reveal the factors that affect 
choice among risky alternatives as well as the 
decision weights that are assigned to each of 
these factors. Results of these analyses would 
indicate the potential for trade-offs among at- 
tributes and, in the absence of a single metric 
for risk and benefit, suggest the relative impor- 
tance of the several factors in the actual choice 
process. Whereas research on the dimensions of 
perceived risk (and benefit) are valuable in their 
own right, we sense that the policy relevance of 
these findings will be more quickly grasped when 
they are cast within a framework of choice and 
behavioral response. In line with the recent work 
of Vlek and Stallen, we would argue for a shift 
in emphasis toward a more decision-theoretic 
framework that would focus research on the 
choice among activities that were characterized, 
in part, by risky consequences. 
3. PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF RISK AND THE 
THRESHOLD OF ACCEPTABLE RISK 
A crucial distinction in the study of perceptions 
of risk is that between (a) the levels of risk that the 
individual is willing to accept for himself in the 
course of his daily activities and (b) the levels of risk 
that the collectivity is willing to accept (tacitly or 
explicitly) as one of the several costs associated with 
the generation of a public benefit. We feel that the 
former question can be addressed from the theoret- 
ical perspective that we have outlined in the preced- 
ing section and about which we will have more to say 
in the next section. The latter question, concerning 
the “social acceptance” of risk, is more complex. 
Arrow’s paradox aside, one might speculate that 
within an idealized “democratic” culture, topical 
questions, such as the determination of socially 
acceptable levels of risk, could be resolved through 
the (weighted) aggregation of individual preferences. 
(1) the biases present in existing social and political 
traditions; 
(2) the fallibility of institutionalized procedures for 
social decision-making; 
(3) a substantial investment in an existing “subopti- 
mal” course of action; 
(4) a strategic balancing of preferences across dis- 
parate spheres of activity; 
(5 )  an imprecise understanding of the secondary im- 
pacts of specific decisions or courses of action; 
(6) the lack of information regarding feasible alter- 
natives; 
(7) the pressure exerted by highly motivated and 
resourceful minorities. 
A full investigation of these and related topics would 
require the concerted efforts of specialists in such 
disciplines as political science, sociology, economics, 
engineering, and law, and is beyond the scope of the 
present discussion. 
In keeping with the social science orientation of 
the present discussion, we would like to review briefly 
a selection of literature that highlights some of the 
difficulties of determining a threshold of “socially 
acceptable” risk. Indeed, in light of the complexities 
that characterize any social decision-making process, 
and the theoretical and empirical ferment that char- 
acterize research in this field, we are doubtful that 
any threshold of “socially acceptable” risk can be 
derived analytically at the present time. 
In the section that follows we will note briefly 
the formal, analytic methods that have been proposed 
for the determination of socially acceptable levels of 
risk. We will discuss as well the reasons why these 
methods have proved problematic in practice. 
Analytically derived standards for public safety are 
particularly vulnerable in the face of conflicting or 
competing value systems, as a brief review of the 
nuclear power and fluoridation controversies demon- 
strate~.(~’~~’) This suggests that the development of 
socially acceptable standards for risk wi l l  depend, in 
part, on a better understanding of these conflicting 
value systems, with special emphasis on the potential 
for social mobilization in defense of mutually exclu- 
sive intergroup values. We point out, however, that 
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research along these lines will be difficult and will 
likely require new forms of interdisciplinary coopera- 
tion. 
3.1. Analytic Approaches to Risk Analysis 
A variety of analytic approaches have been ap- 
plied to the analysis of risk from technologies with 
the objective of determining a socially optimal trade- 
off between risks and benefits. These methodologies 
are generically grouped under such headings as risk- 
benefit analysis, decision analysis, cost-effectiveness 
analysis, and the like. The characteristic common to 
all of them is a formal structure that strives to make 
explicit the assumptions, value judgments, and criteria 
that shape and guide the decision process. Thus, they 
seek first to quantify all relevant aspects of a decision 
involving technical risk and then calculate the opti- 
mal trade-off between (a) the benefits of the risky 
technology, and (b) the probability or magnitude of 
the potential adverse consequences of that technol- 
ogy * 
The stated advantage of these approaches is that 
they provide an explicit structure for addressing 
problems that can be exceedingly complex. The tech- 
nologies in question may be imperfectly understood, 
either in terms of their long-term operating character- 
istics or their secondary impacts. As regards the 
potential social impacts, these may entail difficult 
value trade-offs, or suggest disturbing equity impacts. 
Furthermore, there may be uncertain institutional 
consequences either in terms of further 
reinforcing selected institutional structures or creat- 
ing serious new challenges to already embattled in- 
stitutions. Problems of this magnitude may be intrac- 
table by any intuitive decision-making process; thus 
formal methodologies can serve, in the minimum, to 
structure the question at hand and, thereby, highllght 
the associated unknowns and imponderables. 
It is generally recognized, however, that these 
procedures are not perfect. For the most part they 
have been developed within institutional frameworks 
in which a formal decision-making responsibility 
could be identified, objectives stated, and potential 
outcomes enumerated. With respect to decision- 
making in the public sector, however, these condi- 
tions are rarely met. Decision-making authority may 
be quite dispersed, the broader objectives of social 
institutions are frequently a source of controversy in 
themselves, and the outcomes, at least in the long 
term, are rarely known with any precision. Thus, 
despite their potential advantages, analytic proce- 
dures for risk analysis in the public sector may be 
inapplicable; especially as one passes from the level 
of decision-making within a single institution to that 
of policy-making for the entire nation. Policy recom- 
mendations which stem from these approaches are 
likely to be challenged seriously in the political arena 
if they threaten the value systems or belief structures 
of politically active and resourceful minorities. 
A major and unresolved question in this field of 
research is that of determining threshold levels of 
acceptable risk: Is there a socially acceptable level 
of risk against which system designers might gauge 
their efforts? Economists argue that social preference 
functions should be derived from historical market 
records of choice and behavior.“’) Starr has extrapo- 
lated from this concept in his frequently cited at- 
tempt to determine the social acceptance of risk from 
technologies.(34) His stated concern in performing this 
analysis was to focus the issue of public safety on a 
“tangible, quantitative, engineering design objective” 
for use, for example, in the design of safety features 
for nuclear electric power plants.(34) The use of his- 
torical data, some of which is of questionable accu- 
racy, leaves open the question of whether one can 
distinguish “what is ‘best’ for society from what is 
‘traditionally’ acceptable.” After generating time- 
series data for a collection of indicators of social risks 
and social benefits, Starr fit a set of curves suggest- 
ing, among other things, a substantial difference in 
the willingness of people to accept “voluntary” risks, 
such as cigarette smoking, as compared to “involun- 
tary” risks, such as those associated with the genera- 
tion of electric power. 
Starr’s methodology rests on two assumptions, 
which he notes at the outset of his investigation: first, 
“that historical national accident records are ade- 
quate for revealing consistent patterns of fatalities in 
the public use of technology;” and second that “his- 
torically revealed social preferences and costs are 
sufficiently enduring to permit their use for predictive 
purposes.”(34) 
The results of Starr’s analysis, as well as the 
methodology with which they were derived, have 
been critically reviewed by Otway and C~hen(~’) and 
Fischhoff et. a1.(l6) In a reanalysis of Starr’s time 
series data Otway and Cohen were unable to replicate 
Starr’s reported results, and concluded by noting 
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that: 
the results of this method appear to be excessively sensitive 
to the assumptions made and the handling of data; the 
present existence of any such mathematical risk-benefit 
relationships, based upon this approach, would seem un- 
likely ... There is clearly some relationship between the 
beneEts perceived to be derived from an activity and the 
perceived cost of participation. The relationships are, how- 
ever, not simple mathematical ones, but complicated and 
strongly influenced by mciepsychological mechanisms which 
are as yet not well understood.(35) 
Despite the serious epistemological and methodologi- 
cal difficulties associated with attempts to quantify a 
socially acceptable threshold for technological risk, 
the incentive to do so remains high. Alternative meth- 
odologies have been proposed [e.g., see Rowe in ref. 
(36), Okrent and Whipple (37)], and the debate within 
the professional community is continuing. 
3.2. Public Controversies over Technological Risk 
The advantages of formal approaches to the 
analysis of technological risk would appear to be 
greatest in those instances where the consequences of 
a potential accident are quite high. Paradoxically, 
when risks assume a “catastrophic” potential, the 
value of a formal analysis may decline sharply. By 
their nature, risk-benefit analyses are obliged to in- 
corporate and make explicit certain assumptions, 
value trade-offs, and decision criteria; the explication 
of these assumptions is considered to be a merit of 
the procedure by some.(38) The complexity of a major 
risk-benefit analysis, however, leaves it subject to 
legitimate scientific scrutiny and rebuttal. On points 
where the technical judgment is unanimous, the gen- 
eral public is likely to defer to the expert view. The 
development of a scientific controversy over the merits 
of the report, however, may serve to stimulate public 
controversy and political mobilization. 
Organized groups that are seeking to represent a 
particular viewpoint in the political arena, tend to use 
scientific evidence selectively and in a manner that 
supports their po~i t ion . ‘~~.~)  Consequently, pressure 
groups with an identifiable stake in an impending 
policy decision may legitimately challenge the find- 
ings of a formal risk analysis by questioning key 
assumptions and by presenting conflicting evidence. 
On the one hand, the formal analysis may be char- 
acterized as an intentionally biased and, therefore, 
political document; on the other hand, it may be 
dismissed as a fundamentally flawed analysis. Case 
studies of such contro~ersies(~~-~~) suggest that by 
challenging the scientific legitimacy of an expert re- 
port, the opponents of a technology not only may 
negate the impact of certain expert advice, but may 
also stimulate public debate and political action. 
Thus, a complex and potentially controversial risk- 
benefit analysis may backfire as a policy tool: 
... We generally assume that informed scientific advice is 
valuable to political policy-makers. However, in the context 
of a controversial political issue, and when the relevant 
technical analysis is ambiguous, then the value of scientific 
advice becomes questionable. A technical controversy some- 
times creates confusion rather than clarity and it is possible 
that the dispute itself may become so divisive and widespread 
that scientific advice becomes more of a cost than a benefit 
to the policy-maker and society.(41) 
When such disputes occur at the community level, 
and the protagonists are willing to engage in a direct 
confrontation of their opinions, one might attempt to 
reconcile the differences through a dialogue proce- 
dure. This would entail the engagement of facts with 
values and, in particular, scientific judgment with 
decision-makers’ values. Vickerd4’) regards “facts as 
relevant only in relation to some judgment of value 
and judgments of value as operative only in relation 
to some confrontation of fact. . .Judgments 
disclose.. . a set of readiness to distinguish some 
aspects of the situation rather than others and to 
classify these in this way rather than that.” Social 
decision theorists(43) have developed face-to-face pro- 
cedures for groups to confront and deal with these 
problems at the community level. Three steps are 
involved: 
Objectively measured variables and externaliza- 
tion of the scientific judgments implied by these 
data. 
Externalization of the social value judgments- 
meaning the importance of outcome dimensions. 
Integration of the two forms of judgments in- 
cluding the salience of “facts” to “values” and 
vice versa. 
The first two steps might be developed indepen- 
dently, and often are,- but their integration requires a 
dialogue for the discovery of omitted facts and 
unforseen values. Apart from its role in policy deci- 
sion-making the model suggests aspects of personal 
decision-making that will be discussed in more detail 
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in the next section. The model is most readily applied 
within the framework of a community-level dispute. 
Controversies surrounding the social acceptability of 
risk, however, frequently assume a national scope as 
aspects of national policies are called into question. 
The direct dialogue approach may be less applicable 
in these circumstances. 
The establishment of “socially acceptable” 
thresholds for technological risk will require, at a 
minimum, the acquiescence of large segments of the 
population. Consequently, there is an incentive for all 
parties involved in a technological controversy to 
appeal directly to the lay persons who comprise the 
vast majority of the general public. The lay public 
constitutes a latent political resource that may be 
mobilized in support of, or in opposition to, a con- 
troversial risky technology. An indirect effect of such 
public information campaigns could be the establish- 
ment of (inconsistent) thresholds for the public 
acceptance of risk in reference to specific, controver- 
sial technologies rather than the design of technologi- 
cal systems in light of a publicly accepted threshold 
for risk. The associated concern among technologists 
is that analytic consistency in the determination of 
standards for risk may fall prey to the political 
process.0’) 
3.3. Value Conflicts and Social Movement 
Organizations 
Recent history demonstrates that within most 
western democracies, public debates over the risks 
associated with technologies have become more fre- 
quent and occasionally quite d i v i s i ~ e . ( ~ * ~ ~ )  Given that 
most members of the public are unaware of the 
technicalities that are involved, either by lack of 
appropriate training or through lack of interest, the 
most effective strategy for the protagonists in these 
debates is to appeal directly to the personal or social 
values that can be rallied in defense of their position. 
Thus, nuclear power has been defended under the 
banner of continued economic growth, energy inde- 
pendence, national prestige, and general “progress;” 
it has been opposed with reference to public health 
and safety, the concentration of economic and politi- 
cal authority, and the threat of terror i~m.(’~~~-~’)  At 
least three issues are involved here. The first is the 
social distribution of potentially conflicting value sys- 
tems and belief structures which might serve to seg- 
ment the public in a manner that favors one or the 
other of the protagonists. The second issue concerns 
the strategies and tactics of those organized groups 
that are working actively to mobilize political sup- 
port, both in the public domain or in the more 
restricted realm of the political and economic “elites.” 
Finally, if one is interested either in an empirical 
description of these processes or in the possibility of 
predicting their impacts, then one should review the 
suitability of the predominant social science method- 
ologies. 
Empirical studies of social behavior, such as the 
Survey Research Center’s studies of attitudes toward 
violen~e(~9~) have demonstrated that the hnk between 
an individual‘s conception of social issues and the 
same individual’s predisposition toward participation 
in social action is mediated by such factors as: a 
general willingness to participate in group activities, a 
positive identification with potential group leaders, a 
belief in the efficacy of social action, and one’s 
physical proximity to locations of social and political 
ferment. Therefore, within a large group of individu- 
als, each of whom shares an approximately compara- 
ble perspective on the desirability of social change, 
many will not act on their beliefs, some will act alone, 
some will get caught up in a social action movement, 
and a very small fraction will initiate collective 
behavior. Despite the low percentage of social activists 
and group leaders, there remains a pool of individu- 
als that constitutes a latent source of support for 
social action if the means for mobilizing this resource 
can be identified. 
S~hattschneider‘~’) and others have discussed the 
potential for mobilizing this latent source through 
deliberate efforts to redefine the questions that con- 
stitute current political debate and thereby restruc- 
ture the pending social-political agenda. Bachrach 
and Baratd4’) have emphasized the crucial role that 
values and belief structures play in this process. With 
specific references to health and safety legislation, 
Walker(”) has discussed and documented the growth 
of agenda-setting forces in the U.S. Senate that were 
stimulated in part by the perception of widespread 
popular support for new regulatory efforts in these 
fields. The apparent spread of technological con- 
troversies in western nations has been attributed in 
part to a general decline in public confidence in 
science and te~hnology.(~’-~~) Nelkin and Fallows 
argue that a major factor stimulating the nuclear 
power debate is public concern for “the concentra- 
tion of power in impersonal expertise-dominated 
bureaucracies.”(54) With respect to environmental 
Perspectives on Risk Perceptions 153 
controversies, Ingelhart(55p56) has focused on the 
emergence of “post-materialist” values in western 
societies. As these references suggest, the political 
sensitivity of previous “non-issues” may increase sub- 
stantially through the emergence or deliberate exploi- 
tation of new value systems. Skillful disputants in a 
public controversy will argue not only the merits of 
the program under scrutiny, but also the relevance of 
the value systems and belief structures by which that 
program will be adjudged. Thus, divergences in value 
orientations among members of the general public 
represent potential lines of cleavage which can be 
exploited to shape a new political agenda. 
A properly designed survey instrument can study 
directly the social distribution of potentially conflict- 
ing value systems and, through an analysis of demo- 
graphic characteristics, evaluate the economic and 
political resources represented by these potentially 
political factions. Latent support for specific posi- 
tions in a public controversy can be linked with 
individual values and beliefs, and the strengths of 
these associations can be analyzed. Survey data can 
indicate the spreading recognition of, and potential 
support for, organized social movement groups with 
specific stakes in a public controversy. These data 
can incorporate as well measures of belief systems 
and personality characteristics that predict political 
participatiod5“ and the justification of potentially 
disruptive political and social Thus, we 
feel that the analytic scope of survey research has 
expanded considerably in recent years. By its nature, 
however, survey research is addressed to the attitudes 
and attributes of individuals. When considering the 
potential for political mobilization, the survey ap- 
proach has acknowledged limits. 
A survey approach is useful in identifying sub- 
groups within the population that share particular 
value systems; we might refer to these subgroups as 
“factions.” M O ~ ( ~ ~ )  refers to factions as collections of 
individuals interested in common problems or 
motivated by common purposes. Although in part 
factions define the social climate, their structural 
diffuseness and incapacity for endurance may render 
them less important in the political process than 
organized groups. From this perspective one might 
challenge the pluralist notions of common interest 
factions and emphasize the need for coercion, sep- 
arate incentives, or collective goods in the achieve- 
ment of organizational form and influence.(59) 
Students of social movements, such as McCarthy 
and Zald,cm) M o ~ , ( ~ ~ )  or Gamson and Modigliani 
(personal communication), argue that a. like-minded 
faction may constitute a potential resource for social 
action, but does not by itself constitute a social 
movement. In their work they emphasize the profes- 
sionalization of social movements and the means for 
mobilizing resources. Zald emphasized financial 
resources apart from membership strength and is 
working on the ideological and social location of the 
pro- and antinuclear groups within the context of 
general social movement theory. Gamson and Mod- 
igllani stress the role of the media in generalizing 
political symbols and metaphors that serve to frame 
and justify a position. They propose three types of 
engagement with social issues: self-interest, group 
identification, and social benefit ideology. Moe em- 
phasizes economic model and the politics of organi- 
zational formation and maintenance, but recognizes 
as well departures from the economic ideal. While 
economic self-interest plays a major explanatory role 
in describing the behaviors of interest groups, he feels 
there are good reasons for investigating the behav- 
ioral implications of other, more diffuse value struc- 
tures. Walker (work in progress) is analyzing public 
interest groups from the perspective of their links 
with social legislation, their associations with public 
bureaucracies, and their sources of funds. Access to 
government decision-making channels is a key focus 
of his research. 
Since relatively few individuals belong to any 
particular set of organizations, a cross-sectional survey 
is not well suited to the study of organized, socially 
active groups. Survey data can be usefully comple- 
mented, however, by a parallel analysis of the 
organized social movement groups that are seeking to 
influence the pending political agenda. Research on 
the organizational strategies and mobilization tactics 
of social movement groups is being pursued by a 
number of sociologists who are using the public 
controversy over energy policies as their topical focus. 
To cite one example with which we are familiar, Zald, 
Gamson, and Modigliani are presently operationaliz- 
ing their approaches to the study of social movements 
(and counter-movements) by focusing on the organi- 
zations and groups involved in the nuclear power 
controversy. They have interviewed the leadership of 
most of the pro- and antinuclear groups and are 
currently surveying their active memberships through 
attendance at conferences and public rallies. They are 
studying the structure of these organizations as well 
as their funding sources and sponsorship. Through 
secondary analyses of newspapers and journals, as 
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well as through direct interviews with organization 
cadres, they are reviewing the alliances between social 
movement groups and their common mobilization 
strategies. 
Work of this type, as well as that of other 
political scientists and sociologists not referenced 
here, would significantly enhance the interpretation 
of survey data concerning the public’s perception of, 
and reactions to, technological risks. Research on the 
strategies and objectives of social movement groups 
concerned with risk issues could highlight the topical 
focus of their public information campaigns as well 
as the value systems and belief structures they were 
designed to exploit. Survey data, particularly that 
collected at multiple points in time, could indicate 
the extent to which these “messages” had been recog- 
nized and adopted by factions within the general 
public. To the best of our knowledge, however, there 
has been no recent attempt to combine survey work 
with sociological case studies in a concerted effort to 
analyze the implied brokerage of public opinion. This 
approach may lead to valuable new insights involving 
the cross-fertilization of theory and methodoIogy in 
both areas of research. Such an attempt would cer- 
tainly breach a currently accepted division of intel- 
lectual labor. 
3.4. Discussion 
As was mentioned at the opening of this section, 
the “social acceptability” of risk is affected by 
numerous social, political, and institutional factors, 
many of which fall outside the scope of the present 
discussion. A limited review of recent literature sug- 
gests, however, that the social processes affecting the 
acceptance of risk are multiple, complex and poorly 
understood. A variety of theoretical approaches and 
research methodologies are taking shape which con- 
ceivably could be used to investigate the processes 
that determine social standards for acceptable risk. 
At the present time, however, there is no body of 
social science data that could be used to establish 
specific thresholds of socially acceptable risk. 
Formal, analytic approaches to the study of “so- 
cially acceptable’’ risks have a number of attractive 
characteristics that have been noted widely in the 
literature. First, they provide structure for decision 
problems that would have an otherwise bewildering 
complexity. Furthermore, they can make explicit the 
assumptions or value judgments that might be left 
unstated in a less rigorously structured analytic pro- 
cedure. The analysis can have considerable heuristic 
value for those who participate in its development 
and for those who are capable of interpreting the 
results. The conclusions indicate courses of action 
that are in keeping with narrowly defined notions of 
economic efficiency and social optimality. For the 
most part, these methodologies are normative: they 
indicate what society “ought to do” in light of avail- 
able data and a variety of assumptions. 
The normative character of the formal, analytic 
approaches is, perhaps, their most telling weakness as 
instruments of policy analysis. At the present time, 
policy - makers are faced with numerous risk - 
management choices for which the relevant informa- 
tion is only partially in hand. Information is needed 
that would help policy-makers in the following areas: 
(1) the establishment of priorities in the allocation 
of funds for risk management programs; 
(2) the establishment of priorities in the determina- 
tion of safety standards; 
(3) the anticipation of demands for information 
from concerned public groups; 
(4) the evaluation of the stability and credibility of 
expert and public opinion related to safety is- 
sues; and 
( 5 )  the forecasting of public reactions to safety 
standards and risk abatement guidelines. 
Of these five policy-support activities, a formal risk- 
benefit analysis could contribute to the first two, but 
would be of little or no assistance in the latter three. 
In particular, a formal risk-benefit analysis would be 
of questionable value if it led to a conclusion that 
was strongly opposed by a broad segment of the 
public, or by a resourceful and active organization 
that was seeking to represent the public’s interests. 
In the event of negative public responses to 
proposed safety standards and risk abatement guide- 
lines, it would be of interest to policy-makers to 
determine whether the rejection of the policy was due 
a misperception of the inherent risks; 
a misreading of the formal risk analysis on 
which the guidelines were based; 
a failure on the part of the formal analysis to 
consider important dimensions of the techno- 
logical risks and benefits; or 
the inability of the analytic procedure to reflect 
the value systems and belief structures within 
which the risks and benefits are scrutinized. 
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The psychometric research reviewed in the previ- 
ous section highlights a tendency on the part of the 
general public to misperceive risks as they are form- 
ally defined. That same body of research indicates, 
however, that perceived risk is a multidimensional 
concept and that only one of those dimensions is 
approximated by a formal definition, such as the 
number of fatalities per m u m  or the risk of death 
per hour exposure. Even less is known about the 
possible dimensions of “perceived benefit.” Thus, it is 
unlikely that the currently practiced analytic method- 
ologies will effectively reflect such public concerns as 
“dread” and “catastrophic potential‘’ or their as yet 
unidentified complements in the realm of perceived 
benefits. In order for policy-makers to better antic- 
ipate public reactions to technological risks, they wi l l  
need access to more descriptive research of the type 
reviewed in the two preceding sections of this report. 
One of the major, unresolved issues complicating 
research on the social acceptance of risk is that 
concerning the individual‘s decision to adopt and to 
actively support a specific position in a public debate. 
It is assumed that perceptions of risks and benefits 
weigh heavily in that decision process. A review of 
the nuclear power and fluoridation debates indicates, 
however, that a variety of other considerations may 
influence the decision process. Individuals may give 
differential weight to broader social options, such as 
the pursuit of economic growth, the centralization of 
political authority, or the importance of national 
prestige. These differentially weighted values may 
lead individuals to adopt conflicting viewpoints on 
specific social questions in spite of their agreement 
on the relevant technical information. In addition, an 
individual‘s predisposition toward acting on a per- 
sonal conviction will be influenced by his/her 
personality characteristics as well as by specific con- 
textual parameters. Finally, we must consider the 
(fallible?) cognitive processes by which all of this is 
assimilated and processed in the course of reaching a 
decision. This leads us to speculate on two closely 
related points: the possible “irrationality” of the gen- 
eral public in its decisions regarding risks; and the 
relative weights assigned to risks, benefits, and the 
other criteria in the overall decision process. 
Numerous individual and social activities com- 
port some element of risk, as has been emphasized 
recently by the publication of comparative risk ta- 
bles. Unless the decisions to undertake or promote 
these activities, however, have been made specifically 
with respect to the risk involved, it would be inap- 
propriate to charge broad segments of the general 
public with “irrationality” for having personally con- 
doned some activities (e.g., driving) while having 
rejected others (e.g., the construction of a nuclear 
electric power plant). Furthermore, “risk”, however 
defined, may not be the primary factor influencing 
the individual‘s position in a public controversy. It 
would be inappropriate therefore to equate a social 
decision on a specific activity or technology with a 
decision on a socially acceptable level of risk. Con- 
siderations of “risk” legitimately may have been bal- 
anced against other factors in the decision process. 
The latter comment leads directly to the second 
point mentioned above; namely, the relative weights 
assigned to specific components of a decision prob- 
lem. The topic of decision-making under conditions 
of risk and uncertainty has been discussed extensively 
in the literature and the next section of our paper is 
devoted to a review of selected theoretical models. 
4. CHOICE AND DECISION-MAKING UNDER 
CONDITIONS OF RISK AND 
UNCERTAINTY 
The study of choice and decision-making under 
conditions of risk and uncertainty has become an 
important field of inquiry for researchers in many 
fields. The literature now includes studies undertaken 
not only in psychology and economics, but also in 
political science, medicine, geography, and the 
numerous interdisciplinary specialties focusing on 
aspects of planning and policy-making. Published 
articles have become so numerous that overviews and 
summaries of findings are appearing every three or 
four years.(8,61-68) In this section we shall highlight 
some of the general conclusions and alternative ap- 
proaches that appear to have a direct bearing on the 
individual reactions to perceived risk. 
Expected utility the~ry(~’.~’) has guided more 
than 30 years of research on decision-making under 
conditions of risk. Leading theorists have accepted it 
as a normative model for national behavior(71) and 
have argued that reasonable people should strive to 
obey the axioms of the theory.(72) Psychologists and 
other investigators, however, seeking to apply the 
logical precepts of the theory as a descriptive tool, 
have noted n u m e r o u s  and  persistent 
a n o m a l i e ~ . ( ’ ~ * ~ ~ - ~ ~ )  On the basis of evidence that is 
presently available one can argue that expected utility 
theory has purchased its formal elegance and norma- 
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tive power through the adoption of a rigorously re- 
ductionistic perspective. In doing so, the theory has 
compromised its descriptive potential when address- 
ing problems involving subjective estimates of proba- 
bility. Tversky and Kahneman have commented that: 
The major contribution of this approach is that it provides a 
rigorous subjective interpretation of probability which is 
applicable to unique events and is imbedded in a general 
theory of rational decision.. . For judged probabilities to be 
considered adequate, or rational (however), internal con- 
sistency is not enough. The judgments must be compatible 
with the entire web of beliefs held by the individual.. . The 
rational judge.. .will attempt to make his probability judg- 
ments compatible with his knowledge about (1) the subject 
matter; (2) the laws of probability; and (3) his own heuristics 
and biases.(’4) 
of the subjective reference point that is used in the 
evaluation of possible gains and losses. 
Prospect theory responds to these observations 
by incorporating two premises that deviate markedly 
from those of expected utility theory. First, “value is 
assigned to gains and losses rather than to final 
assets;” second, “probabilities are replaced by deci- 
sion weights.”(78) The actual choice process is as- 
sumed to involve two stages: an editing phase in 
which prospects are coded and simplified, and an 
evaluation phase in which the more highly valued 
prospect is chosen. 
The editing phase recalls the earlier discussion of 
heuristics and biases: prospects are mentally coded as 
gains or losses with respect to a subjectively de- 
termined reference point, aspects common to the 
offered prospects are discarded or cancelled, 
dominated prospects are rejected, and the remaining 
prospects are simplified through rounding and the 
like. Kahneman and Tversky note that the represen- 
tation of the “final edited prospects could, therefore, 
depend on the sequence of editing operations, which 
is likely to vary with the structure of the offered set 
Recently elaborated theories of choice have at- 
tempted to enhance their descriptive capabilities by 
incorporating features such as limits on human infor- 
mation processing, personal risk preference functions, 
and context effects. In doing so, the general notion of 
“satisficing” has come to dominate that of utility 
maximization in the recent literature. 
4.1. Prospect Theory 
Kahneman and Tversky’s prospect theory exem- 
plifies recent trends in this field.(78) Their review of 
the experimental literature highlights several classes 
of choice problems for which the tenets of expected 
utility theory are violated consistently. The evidence 
suggests that people consistently overweight out- 
comes that can be considered as “certain” relative to 
those that are merely “probable”. Whereas this “cer- 
tainty effect” leads to risk aversion when the pro- 
spects are evaluated as gains, it leads to risk seeking 
when the prospects are evaluated as losses. Thus, a 
preference for a certain gain in the positive domain is 
replaced by a preference to avoid a certain loss in the 
negative domain. Furthermore, as a means of sim- 
plifying choice problems, subjects tend to focus their 
attention on aspects of the offered choices that serve 
to distinguish one from the other; common compc- 
nents are disregarded (the “isolation’’ effect). Thus, 
inconsistent choice patterns can be observed by 
merely altering the representation of the prospects. 
Finally, experiments suggest that subjects infer the 
value of a prospect with respect to the possible gains 
and losses it entails rather than in reference to their 
final assets. This observation stresses the importance 
and with the format of the display.. . Many anomalies 
of preference result from the editing process.”(78) 
During the evaluation phase, the edited prospect 
with the highest weighted value is selected. Kahne- 
man and Tversky argue that “the carriers of value are 
changes in wealth or welfare.. . (thus). . . value should 
be treated as a function in two arguments: the asset 
position that serves as reference point and the magni- 
tude of change (positive or negative) from that refer- 
ence point.”(78) Value is weighted not by probabili- 
ties, however, but by decision weights that “measure 
the impact of events on the desirability of prospects 
(rather than) the perceived likelihood of these 
Decision weights themselves exhibit a 
number of properties that violate standard assump- 
tions. Of particular note is the finding that small 
probabilities tend to be overweighted and that deci- 
sion weights rarely sum to unity. 
We feel that prospect theory is relevant to a 
research program on risk perceptions for several rea- 
sons. By redefining value as a relative concept and by 
replacing subjective probability estimates with deci- 
sion weights, prospect theory provides for a more 
robust descriptive account of choice under risk than 
does expected utility theory. Furthermore, though the 
theory has been demonstrated in reference to gam- 
bles involving monetary outcomes, the authors of the 
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theory feel that it is “readily applicable to choices 
involving other attributes, e.g., quality of life or the 
number of lives that could be saved or lost as a 
consequence of a policy decision.”(78) The hypothe- 
sized editing phase of the choice process remains 
something of a “black box.” Current research on 
human information processing and schemata may 
suggest guidelines for prestructuring choice problems, 
thereby allowing for a post hoc interpretation of this 
phase of the choice process. In the event that one can 
devise choice problems for which the anticipated 
gains and losses can be unambiguously identified, it 
should be possible to generate empirical estimates for 
the relevant decision weights. 
4.2. Portfolio Theory: Personal Risk Preference 
Coombs has developed a theory of decision- 
making under conditions of risk in which the choice 
among uncertain options is conceptualized as a com- 
promise between the maximization of expected value 
and the optimization of the level of risk.(77) As such, 
the theory postulates the existence of a personal risk 
preference function that is single-peaked for fixed 
expected values.(79) 
With expected value fixed, then a gamble reflects a conflict 
between greed and fear, and approach-avoidance conflict, 
and this condition means that for each individual there is an 
optimum level at which greed and fear arc in unstable 
balance-at a lower level of risk, greed drives him on, and at 
a higher level of risk, fear holds him back-so preference 
falls off in either direction from the optimum 
Indeed, the nature of “risk” is left undefined by the 
formal theory. Coombs states that “the purpose of 
portfolio theory is to provide a basis for making 
inferences about the riskiness of gambles from prefer- 
ential choices.”(’’) 
We feel that the risk preference function of 
portfolio theory may provide an additional means by 
which to judge the levels of risk that are perceived to 
be associated with technologies. As was mentioned 
earlier, preference orderings among technologies can 
be analyzed on the basis of the attributes that are 
associated with them. For technologies that render 
comparable services (approximately equal expected 
values from the perspective of the subject), it may be 
possible to obtain an indicator of perceived “pure 
risk” by predicting the preference ordering on the 
basis of the schedule of principal attributes and then 
analyzing the residual. The success of this approach 
will depend, of course, on specifying a predictive 
model that incorporates the major, relevant attri- 
butes. In the event that risk preference is a stable 
trait across choice tasks, it may be possible to pursue 
this approach by developing a separate indicator of 
risk preference from an analysis of choice among 
gambles, entering this indicator into the predictive 
model, and then analyzing changes in the residual. 
We sense that Coombs’ portfolio theory has signifi- 
cant empirical, as well as theoretical, interest for new 
research in this field. 
4.3. Elimination by Aspects and by Trees 
A third theory that would be highly relevant to 
an expanded program of research on risk perceptions 
is that of “elimination by aspects.”(75) Strictly speak- 
ing, elimination by aspects (EBA) is not a model of 
risky choice in the fashion of portfolio theory 
or prospect theory; rather, it is a probabilistic theory 
of choice that views choice as a covert process of 
elimination. Within prospect theory, for example, the 
choice alternatives are characteristically represented 
as having a single aspect relevant to the choice task: 
gains or losses relative to a subjectively determined 
reference point. These gains or losses are then dis- 
counted by application of a decision weight, and the 
prospect with the highest weighted value is selected. 
In the EBA model, the objects of choice are repre- 
sented by sets of aspects (e.g., color, size, cost, com- 
fort, etc.) which both define the object within the 
choice problem and serve as the carriers of value. 
Thus, one might assume that the “rational” subject 
would sum across the value-weighted aspects that 
characterize each of the objects of choice and then 
choose that object with the highest total value. This is 
not the case, however. Instead, choice is assumed to 
proceed by an elimination process during which “an 
aspect is selected (with probability proportional to its 
weight), and all the alternatives that do not include 
the selected aspect are eliminated. The process con- 
tinues until all alternatives but one are eliminated.”(75) 
It should be noted at the outset that the model can be 
formulated as a dual in which aspects are interpreted 
as disadvantages. In this instance the selection of an 
aspect would lead to the elimination of all objects 
that contained the selected aspect. 
One of the more interesting features on the EBA 
model is that it accounts for inconsistencies in choice 
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behavior that stem from “context effects.” A stand- 
ard assumption in the theories of probabilistic choice 
has been that of “simple scalability;” i.e., “that the 
alternatives can be scaled so that each choice proba- 
bility is expressible as a monotone function of the 
scale values of the respective alternative.”(75) This 
assumption implies that if an individual is indifferent 
between two objects, x and y ,  then he should choose 
them with equal probability regardless of the choice 
set within which they are contained. Experimental 
results have demonstrated the assumption to be false: 
choice probabilities can shift markedly depending 
upon the context in which the objects are presented. 
Choice probabilities, therefore, reflect not only the utilities of 
the alternatives in question, but also the difficulty of 
comparing them. Thus, an extreme choice probability (i.e., 
close to 0 or 1 )  can result from either a large discrepancy in 
value or from an easy comparison.. . The comparability of 
the alternatives. however, cannot be captured by their scale 
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This feature underscores the potential effect of public 
information campaigns that seek to characterize an 
object, or a technology, according to a single aspect 
that can be arguably presented as having overriding 
importance to the process of choice. 
Tversky has demonstrated this model using set- 
theoretic notation. Acknowledging the limitations in 
generality which may result from an alternative 
representation of the model, we have considered the 
model within a matrix structure, as illustrated in Fig. 
1. In their simplest form, the entries in the matrix 
(m,,) assume binary values (1,O) to indicate whether 
or not an object of choice ( x i )  includes an aspect 
( a j ) .  Each row in the matrix ( x l )  defines an “aspect 
profile” for an object of choice, thereby specifying 
the subset of aspects that identify a particular object 
within the choice problem; row A’ delimits the subset 
of all possible aspects that are relevant to a particular 
choice problem. Similarly, each column in the matrix 
( A ; )  defines a set of alternatives; i.e., the subset of 
aj A’ - Set of aspects 
u 
mlj x1 - Aspect  profile 
u(a) - Scale of aspect weights 
j l  
mZj x2 - Aspect profile 
m3j x i  - Aspect profile 
I 
mi, xi - Aspect profile 
4 
EBA Model 3 
ae XI j 
a+l 
C u(a)P(x A‘) 
C,,, u(a+l) 
P(x,A) = 
Fig. 1. Matrix Representation of EBA Choice Model. See Tversky(”1 for a full exposition Of 
the model. If the ordering bf attributes can be prespecified, for example through a ranking of 
aspects, then the model becomes lexicographic. EBA Model: this recursive formula expresses the 
probability of choosing x from the total choice set A as a weighted sum of the probabilities of 
choosing x from the proper subsets of A (i t . ,  A f ,  A ; ,  etc.). 
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objects that have a particular aspect in common; 
column A defines the set of objects that are under 
consideration in the choice problem. Finally, we de- 
fine a scale “uj”  which assigns to each aspect a 
positive value that reflects its utility to the decision- 
maker and assume that aspects wil l  be selected in an 
order that approximates the ranking of these scale 
values. 
The choice process represented by the EBA 
model is highly general, though somewhat unwieldy. 
Tversky and Sattath@’) have demonstrated that the 
covert process of elimination represented by EBA can 
be given a hierarchical structure if the objects under 
consideration are not disjoint with respect to aspects 
(see ref. 80: p. 546 and Appendix A). A hierarchical 
tree representation of the choice problem greatly 
simplifies the structure of the decision process and 
drastically reduces the number of parameters in the 
model. Furthermore, Tversky and Sattath demon- 
strate (ref. 80: Appendix B) that the preference tree 
“provides a versatile representation of choice that is 
compatible with both random-access and sequential- 
access strategies” (ref. 80: p. 548). If one were to 
employ this model in a program of research on the 
perceptions of technological risk, the objects of choice 
(activities involving the use or reliance upon a selec- 
tion of technologies) would be evaluated with respect 
to a set of predetermined aspects, such as the sched- 
ules of positive and negative attributes discussed in 
Section 2. of this paper. We feel that the preference 
tree model would be applicable as a theoretical guide 
in the analysis of preferences among risky technolo- 
gies. 
Within the elimination by tree model (EBT), 
choice depends upon the order by which aspects are 
selected and the specification of the aspect profiles 
for the set of objects under consideration. As long as 
each object can be distinguished by a unique aspect, 
then a unique resolution to the problem might be 
assured. Consider, however, the possibility in which 
the last positively weighted aspect is selected, and yet 
several objects are represented in that set of alterna- 
tives (A;); the probability of selecting any one object 
in (A;) is, therefore, a function of the number of 
objects in the set. These probabilities may be more 
tightly specified, however, if we redefine the nature of 
the matrix elements ( m i j )  so that they may assume a 
range of values instead of a simple binary assign- 
ment. In many instances it is reasonable to consider 
the relationship between aspects and objects as being 
one of degrees rather than absolutes, and the ( m i j )  
values might be assigned in a manner that reflects 
judgments on the degree to which an object incorpo- 
rates or reflects a specified aspect. This approach 
should reduce the number of tied objects within any 
set of alternatives ( A ; )  while adding additional detail 
to the aspect profiles (x;). 
The approach suggested in the preceding para- 
graph is quite close to the elicitation procedures that 
have been employed successfully by Slovic et al., by 
Stallen and Vlek, and by Otway and Fishbein. Ob- 
jects (i.e., technologies) and aspects (i.e., risk/benefit 
attributes) could be presented to respondents in the 
format of a modified semantic differential technique. 
By characterizing the technologies along the several 
dimensions of these evaluative scales, the respondents 
would generate aspect profiles in which the matrix 
elements ( m i j )  are permitted to assume a range of 
values. Aspect profiles ( x j )  composed of scaled ma- 
trix elements ( m i j )  would permit an empirical ex- 
ploration of the EBT model. 
4.4. Discussion 
We feel that research on perceptions of techno- 
logical risk should be expanded to incorporate di- 
rectly the issue of preferences among activities that 
involve technological risk. Research on the choice 
among activities involving technological risk should 
seek to explore empirically the descriptive power of 
the several theoretical models discussed above. 
Prospect theory suggests the importance of decision 
weights, as compared with subjective probability 
estimates, in the choice among risky alternatives. We 
sense that this theory would be difficult to opera- 
tionalize in the context of a questionnaire adminis- 
tered to broad segments of the public, but we would 
hope that the effort would be made, perhaps within 
the more restricted domain of an experimental pro- 
ject. Portfolio theory suggests that one should seek to 
develop indicators of personal risk preference, and 
we feel that this task is tractable even within the 
context of a cross-sectional survey. 
Of the several theories reviewed above we feel 
that the EBA/EBT models would be most readily 
adapted to an expanded program of research on risk 
perceptions and their influences on preferences among 
risky activities. The generality of these models is very 
appealing and all of the elicitation procedures have 
been developed either within experimental settings or 
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within survey contexts. The primary question con- 
cerning a direct operationalization of the EBT model 
is whether these separate, proven procedures could be 
employed in a complementary fashion. A schematic 
outline of one possible procedure is as follows. 
First, subjects could be offered a set of objects 
(activities involving risky technologies) and asked to 
indicate their preferences through a sorting process. 
Additionally, these subjects would be asked to rank- 
order a set of pertinent aspects, such as those used by 
Slovic and others to develop risk and benefit profiles 
of technologies, thereby generating an indicator of u. 
Finally, using this same set of objects and aspects, the 
subjects would be asked to develop the matrix of 
elements ( m i j )  which both define the sets of alterna- 
tives with respect to aspects and specify the aspects’ 
profiles. The strength of the model could be tested 
empirically by predicting the preference ordering of 
the objects on the basis of the rank-ordering of 
aspects and the aspect profiles. This possibility will 
be discussed further in the next section, which propo- 
ses a specific methodological approach to further 
research in this area. 
Before moving on, however, we would like to 
make reference to an additional body of theory that 
we feel could have considerable impact on future 
research in this area. A systematic approach to com- 
ponents of cognition, particularly under conditions of 
impoverished information, is developing. In the cur- 
rent literature this approach is variously referred 
to as frames by Charnick,(”) Minsky,‘”) and Goff- 
man,(83) or scripts by Schank and Abel~on@~) and 
Leh~~ert ,@~) or as schema by Becker,(86) Bobrow and 
Norman,(”) and Rumelhart and Ortony.@q Common 
to all these theories is the principle that information 
processing is bottom-up (evoked by incoming data 
and characteristics of stimuli) and also top-down as 
the person searches for information to fit into par- 
tially satisfied, higher-order schemata. Warren et. 
al.(88) have developed an inference taxonomy for in- 
terpreting ambiguous events or event-chains involv- 
ing logical, informational, and value inferences. A 
systematic hierarchy of perceptual levels has been 
proposed by Powers(89) in which heuristics are a high 
level of interpretation. These are the rules that pro- 
voke action under uncertainty. Then there are exist- 
ing models for event perception (equally suitable for 
hypothetical events) and for the behavior-perception 
interface. These models present some severe method- 
ological problems, but we feel they offer a particu- 
larly insightful perspective on the question of choice 
and behavior under conditions of limited and uncer- 
tain information. They could be particularly useful, 
for example, in the development and interpretation of 
projective tests and open-ended probes concerning 
individual responses to hypothetical, though life-like, 
risky choices. Though the predictive power of these 
theories is, as yet, uncertain, their descriptive powers, 
as a unifying thread that runs throughout the several 
bodies of research touched upon in this paper is 
impressive. 
5. METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES 
Future research on perceptions of technological 
risks should seek to inform policy-making activities 
as well as to advance basic understanding of percep- 
tions and their impacts on choice behaviors. Toward 
the attainment of these two broad objectives, at least 
four basic design parameters can be advanced. 
First, we feel that future research should seek to 
explain the perceptions and attitudes of broad seg- 
ments of the population; research performed on tech- 
nically trained elites, or on samples drawn from 
college students, is not representative of the general 
population and may be misleading. Within the gen- 
eral population some individuals will be well- 
informed, some individuals will be technically 
ignorant, and some will be indifferent with respect to 
the issues of technological risk. Given that many of 
the technological issues concerning risk are beyond 
the levels of training and interest of many individu- 
als, it is of considerable interest to determine how 
they characterize risky technologies and activities, 
and how they formulate their potential behavioral 
responses. The clarity, structure, and cohesiveness of 
their perceptual spaces should be explored in detail, 
as well as the changes in perceptual patterns over 
time. 
Secondly, in seeking to explore the structure and 
cohesiveness of these perceptual spaces, future re- 
search should emphasize the development of indi- 
cators of benefit perception. We have speculated on 
the possibility of developing indicators of benefit 
perception that would, roughly speaking, parallel 
those that have been developed for risk perception. 
Our previous research on the perceptions of life qual- 
ity gives us some reason for optimism on this point. 
In any event, the question is open to empirical inves- 
tigation. 
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Thirdly, we feel that future research in this area 
should move explicitly toward an investigation of 
choice and behavior in the face of imperfect informa- 
tion concerning risky alternatives. We have stressed 
this issue at several points in our discussion. It has 
been assumed that perceptions of risk weigh very 
heavily in individual and collective decisions re- 
garding support for technological developments; there 
is relatively little direct evidence on this question, 
however. An effort should be made to clarify the 
extent to which perceptions of risk affect choices 
among activities involving technologies, including the 
weight they are accorded in relation to other aspects, 
such as benefits. 
Finally, as has been suggested above, we feel 
that future research should explore the stability and 
variability of perceptions of risks and benefits, of 
attitudes toward risky technologies, and of behavioral 
responses to risky choice problems. The longitudinal 
survey approach implicit in this formulation of a 
research agenda would be enhanced significantly 
through a direct collaboration with researchers work- 
ing on case studies of social movement organizations. 
6. CONCLUSION 
In this literature review we have sought to draw 
linkages between several bodies of research in a 
manner that would highlight their complementarity 
and would facilitate the planning of new research 
programs on perceptions of technological risk. We 
have suggested a general approach for a renewed 
attack on the question of “perceived benefits” and 
have indicated how measures of perceived risks and 
benefits might be used to predict preferences among 
activities involving risky technologies. We have 
stressed the desirability of moving forward with re- 
search that would incorporate explicitly one or more 
of the recently elaborated theoretical models of choice 
under conditions of risk and uncertainty. We feel that 
this step is necessary not only to understand better 
the means by which individuals elect to support or 
oppose certain technological development, but also to 
make some purchase on the elusive question of “so- 
cially acceptable” risk. On this latter point, we are 
doubtful that the descriptive research which has been 
done up to now is sufficient to justify the establish- 
ment of any thresholds of “socially acceptable” risk. 
Research of a relevant nature is being performed, 
however, by a number of sociologists and political 
scientists. 
Some of the positions we have adopted in this 
paper may be viewed as unorthodox in light of the 
research that is frequently cited in relation to the 
perceived risks of technologies. We hope, nonetheless, 
that they will stimulate new thinking in this relatively 
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